What’s the alternative?

What’s the alternative?

Some politicians object to calls for a ceasefire, asking us, what is our alternative proposal? How is Israel supposed to neutralise the threat of Hamas, if it agrees to end hostilities? Here are some observations and a few suggestions. I am throwing them out there in the spirit of contributing to an ongoing discussion.

Firstly, there is a general agreement that political progress towards a more just situation is needed not only for its own sake but in order to stop the growth of the ideology of Hamas. In other words, you can not put an end to terrorism that feeds off the pain and anger people experience in an unjust situation, without also addressing the underlying injustice. Otherwise, new generations of violence can be created. Justice provides the basis for ongoing peace.

Secondly, there are issues on both sides with regard to political failure in terms of representing the views of the populations of Israel and of Gaza, in terms of behaving within the parameters of international law as governments, and in terms of politicians’ own legal propriety.

On the side of Israel, Prime Minister Netanyahu props up his government with support from ultra-right wing parties such as the pro-settler Religious Zionism party, led by Bezalel Smotrich. Religious Zionism expressly supports expanding Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank: these settlements are already illegal, under international law. Aryeh Deri, leader of the ultra-Orthodox Shas party (and an appointee within Netanyahu’s government), was previously convicted of tax fraud. Last year, the Israeli Knesset voted to allow politicians with non-custodial prison sentences to serve in government, thus enabling Deri to take up his position. Netanyahu himself is at the centre of an ongoing trial for corruption. Israel has seen huge protests against Netanyahu’s government, and these have again grown in intensity because of objections to his failed approach to security, and his lack of concern for hostages. Netanyahu is reported to have been promoting funding Hamas at one point, on the basis that doing so would drive a wedge through Palestinian politics, besides pursuing a policy of disregarding Palestinian rights and the need for a political settlement.

Palestinians have not had elections since 2006, when Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections. Following the collapse of the Palestinian national unity government which was subsequently formed by Hamas and Fatah, Hamas forcibly seized power in Gaza (the West Bank now being governed by Fatah, based in Ramallah) in a violent coup. So Hamas holds political power in Gaza, but lacks a democratic mandate to do so. Gazan residents have protested against the corruption of the Hamas government there: there are credible accusations that the Hamas government has diverted and stockpiled aid for its own financial benefit, and has otherwise engaged in behaviour that benefits itself rather than the people whose interests it is supposed to represent.

Dissent in Gaza is dangerous: videos of the 2019 Palestinian demonstrations against Hamas’ government of Gaza showed Hamas security personnel shooting live ammunition into the air and beating protesters. Multiple Palestinian factions lent their support to the We Want To Live movement and its ‘just demands’: legal protection for workers to prevent them from being exploited; ending price controls by some parties; regulation of the activities of the private sector in Gaza; and relieving citizens from extremely high levels of taxation. The Hamas administration prevented media coverage of the protests.

The situation is manifestly unjust, but it is also a practical failure. Not only because of the huge security risks for both sides that come as the price of any unjust situation, but also because of the waste of human potential. The whole territory is suffering the direct loss of people who had so much to contribute, but who instead have met unnecessary deaths in the armed conflict. There is also the fact that Palestinians are shut out from many opportunities to contribute to wider society, in terms of work. Curtailing the freedom of a group curtails the ability of the whole society to grow and prosper.

Beyond the cost of the removal of human potential from society, war consumes vast amounts of public wealth, taking money away from areas like public healthcare (which benefits everyone) and instead benefitting only those private interests which profit from the manufacture and sale of weapons. Without such huge military expenditure, Israel could enjoy universal public healthcare, instead of watching as public expenditure dwindles and people spend more and more on out-of-pocket private healthcare – or fall through the gaps and lose their health.

In political terms, a focus on war enables the continuing malpractice of governments both in Israel and in Gaza, to the detriment of ordinary people. There is an argument that this war suits the short-term ends of Netanyahu and Hamas by postponing the date of their inevitable removals. No doubt, both may have also hoped for a popularity effect: war often makes leaders more popular, as they’re seen as the figurehead of ‘us’ against ‘them’. Yet the fact is obvious: that on both sides, the leadership has failed its people at a terrible cost in terms of human life.

Lawyers and former judges in the UK have called for the crimes that are alleged to have been committed on both sides to be fairly and thoroughly investigated. The Lawyers’ Letter recommends that the International Criminal Court be tasked with fully investigating, and prosecuting where appropriate, any and all crimes associated with the attack by Hamas on October 7th, and with the Israeli government’s response to that attack.

I suggest that, if these recommendations are carried out immediately and as part of a ceasefire agreement, the action could help to bring an end to the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Gaza.

I hope the investigation would include:

- Investigating all allegations and evidence of physical assault, rape, torture, murder and kidnapping on October 7th both by Hamas members and by individuals who Hamas claims were not members of Hamas but of a different group. In the latter case (if it turns out to be legitimate), it is necessary to find out who was responsible for co-ordinating those attacks as well.

- The investigation would also involve developing a full, fact-based account of what took place on October 7th, helping to dispel any misinformation currently circulating. This would mean investigating the response by Israeli Apache helicopters to the attack by Hamas on the Nova festival, in which it is alleged that some Israeli survivors were killed by Israeli fire; and, likewise, investigating shelling by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) of some of the homes that had been seized by Hamas in the attacks on the kibbutzes, in which it is alleged that some Israeli civilians may have been killed. In investigating the degree to which civilians may have been killed by their own government’s armed response to the attacks, it would be necessary to investigate video evidence which appears to show Hamas members wearing the uniform of the IDF. A full investigation by an outside body into what happened is needed.

- In the context of the counter-attack, investigating the use by Hamas of fighting positions both within and beneath civilian buildings such as hospitals and schools, as well as residential housing units, in Gaza. Similarly, investigating the use by Hamas of ambulances as transport.

- Investigating allegations that Hamas has tried to prevent civilians from leaving areas around and above its fighting positions in Gaza.

- Investigating allegations that Hamas has intentionally either placed civilians in extreme danger, or – as some reports allege – directly fired at them and killed them (in order to produce greater moral outrage against Israel abroad).

- Investigating the degree to which the Israeli government has been responsible for the severe shortages of food, medicine, electricity, and clean water which have been – and still are being – suffered by the civilian population of Gaza.

- Investigating the degree to which the counter-attack on Gaza by Israel represents a disproportionate action by the Israeli government, and an act of collective punishment, and whether, in its targeting of areas which hold large numbers of civilians, it has committed a war crime.

- Investigating whether Israel’s actions can be legally considered to be ‘self-defence’. There is an argument that de facto occupying powers do not have the same recourse to the legal defence of ‘self-defence’ when conducting military operations against the occupied territory. More broadly, investigating the degree to which the military operation by Israel was seen by the Israeli government as being necessary, and the degree to which it was seen by the Israeli government as being desirable. Multiple reports suggest that Netanyahu viewed the events as an opportunity to remove the Gazan population and place them in a separate country, permanently. Any such plans also need to be fully investigated.

- Investigating criminal actions by settlers and by Israeli officials in the West Bank, which have been accelerating rapidly since October 7th. This would include investigation of the killing of 170 Palestinian inhabitants and also of the destruction of Palestinian property.

In terms of immediate action on the issue of hostages and prisoners, in the context of investigation and prosecution of all war crimes associated with October 7th and the associated counter-attacks, an amnesty could be offered for the crime of hostage-taking in exchange for the safe release of the hostages. In practical terms, this would help to preserve the lives of the hostages.

On the Israeli side, there would need to be an immediate end to the policy of detention of Palestinians without charges or a trial: the 1,000+ Palestinians being held without charge or trial should be released, with an equivalent amnesty for those responsible (such that they will not, now or in the future, be charged with wrongful imprisonment). It would be fair for this to begin to happen prior to the hostage release, given the lengths of time for which these people have been in prison already. We could hope that, in the very short term, Hamas would free all civilian hostages in exchange for all Palestinian prisoners being held without charge or trial. In the medium-term, I think it is reasonable to expect Hamas to release the military hostages as part of the ceasefire agreement.

The cases of the remaining Palestinian prisoners within Israel must also be re-examined, on the basis that the law must be equally applied: that is, no Arab Israeli or Palestinian citizen should be imprisoned for a crime for which a Jewish Israeli citizen would not be imprisoned, and also, on the basis that international human rights law must also apply (including freedom of speech and of political expression). This re-examination will result in the release of the large numbers of Palestinians who have been imprisoned on charges of, for example, exhibiting a flag or chanting a slogan, and whose trials have lasted as little as two minutes. Likewise, throwing a stone should not be a crime that carries a custodial sentence when no person has been seriously harmed. At the same time, those prisoners who have committed serious bodily harm, including murder, should remain in prison for the remainder of their sentence.

A legal commission combining Israeli and Palestinian experts might oversee the process of re-examining all these convictions. Perhaps the wider legal community (internationally) could offer additional practical and/or financial support for this process.

While it might seem unrealistic to expect the Israeli government to agree to being investigated for potential war crimes, doing so would also present it with the opportunity to clear its name and prove that – as it claims – it has committed no crime. Likewise, it may seem unrealistic to expect that Hamas would agree to being investigated for war crimes, however, if this were part of a ceasefire agreement meeting their aims of releasing Palestinian prisoners in the ways mentioned above, and if the investigation were to be carried out by the ICC, then they might agree to it.

If all the crimes associated with both the attacks on Israel on October 7th, and the counter-attack on Gaza and within the West Bank since then, are fully investigated and prosecuted, this will not only provide justice for the victims and for Israeli and Palestinian society, it will also, as a result, remove from present action all actors responsible for these crimes.

Once these actors no longer hold power, then Israeli and Palestinian society can begin to rebuild along the peaceful lines which are of benefit to the vast majority of normal people in Israeli and Palestinian territory.

As part of the rebuilding, Israeli negotiator Gershon Baskin, and Sultan Barakat: the founder of the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies in Doha, both recommend a regionally-focused network of support for talks on a new political settlement. This network should involve representatives from Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan, along with the Israeli and Palestinian representatives.

The immediate network could be supported within the UN by the setting up of an outer network of other actors: potentially, the USA, the UK, the EU, Russia, China, and the other BRICS countries. The purpose of this outer network would be to provide any additional expertise and practical support requested by the inner network. For example, the UK has useful experience stemming from the political resolution of its conflict in Northern Ireland.

Because of the previous repeated failure of talks aimed at reaching a two-state solution, and because of the degree to which construction and development on the ground has made that solution harder and harder to achieve, these talks should include both the two-state solution and the alternative Holy Land Confederation peace plan drawn up by Hiba Husseini and Yossi Beilin together with other Israeli and Palestinian experts. This is the ‘two states, one homeland’ proposal, which offers a viable alternative to the traditional two-state option given the interconnectedness and entanglement of Israeli and Palestinian activities and infrastructure now present today. There should be a time-scale for progress on whichever plan gains agreement, with milestones to be agreed in advance.

Alongside this, there should be a programme of practical support for the peaceful co-existence of Israeli and Palestinian people: it should include international funding for peace-building activity by organisations based in Israel and Palestine, who already work in this field at the grassroots level (B’Tselem; Combatants for Peace; Rabbis for Human Rights; Standing Together; members of ALLMEP).

The United Nations Security Council could take steps to set in motion the necessary investigation of all potential war crimes involved, both on October 7th and in the counter-attacks since, and also, to ensure the setting up of peace talks and of the necessary networks to support these. In terms of who should represent Israelis and Palestinians at peace talks, this clearly is a question for Israelis and Palestinians to answer. From the perspective of the international community, the only prerequisites should be that whichever representatives are chosen must have respect for the right of the other territory and people to exist; and they must show that they uphold the principles of human rights law.

In Gaza, a regional, multi-national Arab peacekeeping force (as suggested by other commentators) could assist Gazans in keeping the territory free from a second armed takeover by Hamas or by a replacement extremist Islamist group. Alongside this, there could – separately, and at the same time - be a process within Gaza to support the process of finding and electing new political representatives and forming a new government.

To assist in this process, people with political experience gained in Rojava (the autonomous region of NE Syria) could be invited to come and help develop a new generation of politicians in both the Palestinian territories and in Israel. Rojava politics is designed to absorb and deal with conflict. While developed by ethnic Kurds in the context of their lack of a nation-state, it enshrines the equal rights of all, so the people who can provide expertise from their experience in Rojava include not only Kurds but also Arabs, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Arameans, Turkmen, Armenians and Chechens. Those with experience of the political project in Rojava are specifically experienced in setting up structures of governance that fairly represent all parts of society (including representation of women, as well as different faiths and ethnicities) in extremely difficult situations involving both the presence and aftermath of armed conflict, and they have direct experience in handling extremist ideologies.

SC